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Geoffrey D. Callaghan*  Intervenors at the Supreme Court
 of Canada
My aim in this paper is to offer a normatively attractive and explanatorily 
sound interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to third 
party intervention. The crux of my interpretation is that the policy the Court 
has developed on intervenors allows it to strike a reasonable balance among 
a number of competing democratic considerations, all of which have value in 
the context of judicial decision making. In this respect, the Court should be 
commended for identifying a way to liberalize a practice that possesses many 
democratically-attractive features, but also the inherent capacity to undermine the 
democratic standing of the Court. I buttress my argument against early literature 
on the subject, and use more recent works by Ian Brodie and Benjamin Alarie and 
Andrew Green as argumentative foils.
Mon but dans cet article est d’offrir une interprétation normative attrayante et 
explicative de l’approche de la Cour suprême du Canada en matière d’intervention 
des tiers. L’essentiel de mon interprétation est que la politique que la Cour a 
élaborée à l’égard des intervenants lui permet d’établir un équilibre raisonnable 
entre un certain nombre de considérations démocratiques concurrentes, qui ont 
toutes une valeur dans le contexte du processus décisionnel judiciaire. À cet 
égard, il convient de féliciter la Cour d’avoir trouvé une façon de libéraliser une 
pratique qui possède de nombreuses caractéristiques attrayantes sur le plan 
démocratique, mais en même temps la capacité inhérente de miner la position 
démocratique de la Cour. J’étaye mon argument contre la littérature ancienne sur 
le sujet, et j’utilise les travaux plus récents de Ian Brodie et de Benjamin Alarie et 
Andrew Green comme contrepoids argumentatif.
* Instructor, Laurier University, Law and Society Program. Thanks to Kim Brooks for her incisive 
comments on earlier drafts of the paper. The usual caveats apply.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, intervenor participation has become a routine 
part of the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) hearing process. Since 2000, 
the percentage of appeals featuring at least one intervenor factum has not 
dropped below 35 per cent (in 2001), and was on average 55 per cent.1 
What is more, the presence of intervenors appears to be trending upward: 
the last four years (2015–2018) have been marked by a 63 per cent rate 
of intervenor participation, with the total number of intervening parties 
during that period sitting at 1009 (an average of 252 per year).2 This 
1. The numbers from 2000–2008 can be found at Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Interventions 
at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48:3&4 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 381 at 396. I have personally compiled the numbers for the years 2009–2018, which were accessed 
through LexisNexis and the Supreme Court of Canada website, online: <www.scc-csc.ca> [perma.
cc/8JV6-9QQF]. 
The relevant statistics from 2009–2018 are as follows:
2009: 37 of 62 appeals (60 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2010: 39 of 67 appeals (58 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2011: 37 of 66 appeals (56 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2012: 46 of 75 appeals (61 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2013: 45 of 73 appeals (62 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2014: 46 of 78 appeals (59 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2015: 41 of 66 appeals (62 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2016: 31 of 56 appeals (55 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2017: 42 of 64 appeals (66 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2018: 40 of 60 appeals (67 per cent) featured at least one intervenor. 
2. 319 intervening parties made submissions in 2018; 222 intervening parties made submissions in 
2017; 177 made submissions in 2016; 291 made submissions in 2015.
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represents a significant increase from the 1641 that participated between 
2000 and 2008 (an average of 182 per year).3 
Based on these numbers, one would think the SCC would be relatively 
transparent about its views on intervention. A practice as deeply entrenched 
in the procedural makeup of the Court should be a prime candidate for its 
reflective scrutiny. But the opposite is the case. We have little information 
about the role the justices at the SCC think intervenors play in its 
adjudicative process, and the information we do have is conflicting.4 This 
state of affairs is troubling for a few reasons, most notably because the 
question of whether, when, and which third parties ought to be granted 
leave to intervene at the highest judicial level remains unsettled. Some 
have suggested that interventions further entrench what Morton and 
Knopff disparagingly call “the Court party”5—a coalition that “represents 
a horizontal transfer of power to a new elite, not a vertical transfer of 
power to the people.”6 Others view interventions in a more positive light, 
arguing that they allow the SCC to increase its democratic legitimacy and 
safeguard the independence it enjoys from the wider political sphere at the 
same time.7 Which of these interpretations is the more plausible depends 
largely on the way the practice is understood and used by the Court, and 
because the legitimacy of the Court is bound up in the answer we accept, 
it is no small matter that a genuine attempt be made to hit on the right one.
This paper argues that the policy the Supreme Court has adopted on 
intervention is democratically appropriate. Given that the practice has the 
3. Alarie, supra note 1 at 398.
4. Compare, for instance, Beverley McLachlin’s suggestion that “it’s only just and fair that we 
allow those [who will be affected by our decisions] to present their viewpoints.” The statement was 
made during an interview with Luiza Chwialkowska, “Rein in lobby groups, senior judges suggest,” 
National Post (6 April 2000), online: <www.fact.on.ca/news/news0004/np000406.htm> [perma.cc/
CZ5J-R5KF]) with a recent Notice to the Profession reminding intervenors that “the purpose of an 
intervention is to provide relevant submissions that will be useful to the Court and different from those 
of the other parties”: Supreme Court of Canada, Notice to the Profession “Allotting Time for Oral 
Argument” (March 2017), online: Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.ca/ar-lr/notices-avis/17-
03-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/8H5U-MNJW] [Notice to Profession].
5. This is expressly the position endorsed by Ian Brodie in his book Ian Brodie, Friends of the 
Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2002).
6. F L Morton, “The Charter Revolution and the Court Party” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 627 at 
649.
7. Jillian Welch, “No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter Litigation in the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (1985) 43:2 UT Fac L Rev 204; Philip Bryden, “Public Interest Intervention 
in the Courts” (1987) 66:3 Can B Rev 490; Kenneth P Swan, “Intervention and Amicus Curiae Status 
in Charter Litigation” in Robert J Sharpe, ed, Charter Litigation, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 27; 
John Koch, “Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Intervention” (1990) 48:1 UT Fac L Rev 
151; Sharon Lavine, “Advocating Values: Public Interest Intervention in Charter Litigation” (1992) 2 
NJCL 27.
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capacity to both undermine and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the 
Court, the careful, and sometimes discordant, approach the Court employs 
can be interpreted as an effective balancing of competing democratic 
considerations, all of which have value in the context of judicial decision-
making. 
Before I engage the argument directly, a prefatory remark is in order. 
As will soon become evident, my interpretation takes leave from those 
who wrote on the subject early in the Charter era. As a result, one might 
get the impression that my argument pertains only to cases that feature 
a Charter challenge. While there is prima facie sense to a suggestion of 
this kind—a few former Supreme Court Justices even having appeared 
to accept some version of it8—there is no reason to think that it follows 
directly. Although the Charter did present a clear opportunity for advocates 
of intervention to discuss the democratic potential it held out, that potential 
is in no strict sense tethered to the Charter. To the extent that the Court’s 
decisions in non-Charter cases share the relevant features highlighted by 
early arguments on the practice—in particular, that interests that stand to 
be affected by those decisions may not be adequately represented by the 
direct parties to the case—the same reasoning that pertains to the Court’s 
decision-making in Charter cases pertains as well to its non-Charter 
adjudication.   
The article proceeds as follows. In part I, I outline the basis of early 
arguments on intervention, drawing attention to what was perceived to be 
a democracy deficit facing the Court in the new Charter era. Part II details 
the two prominent later conceptions of intervention—the first offered 
by Ian Brodie, the second by Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green—and 
questions the viability of each as providing comprehensive answers to the 
Court’s fuller approach to the practice. Part III offers a critique of those 
later accounts by proposing an alternative, which I construct largely from 
the democratic concerns that fueled earlier contributions to the literature. 
As mentioned above, my suggestion is that intervention is a mechanism 
by which the Court may balance a number of competing democratic 
considerations, none of which are more essential than any other in the 
8. In a 2000 interview with the National Post, Michel Bastarache J (1997–2008) contended that 
“because of the fact that we have lived with the Charter for 18 years and we have a lot of experience in 
interpreting the Charter...[t]here isn’t the same need there was in 1982 to obtain help from intervenors” 
(Chwialkowska, supra note 4). Later that same year, in an interview with the Globe and Mail, Frank 
Iacobucci J (1991–2004) expressed the same sentiment: “...it’s now getting on to be 18 years or so 
later. Should we be looking at the question [of intervenor participation] in different ways?” (Kirk 
Makin, “Intervenors: How Many Are Too Many?,” The Globe and Mail (10 March 2000), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/intervenors-how-many-are-too-many/article1037654/> 
[perma.cc/Z5ED-X643]).
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context of judicial decision-making. In this respect, the Court should be 
commended for cultivating an approach to intervention that is sensitive to 
both the nature of its own institutional responsibilities and to democratic 
shortcomings the practice can help to address. 
I. Early writings on intervention
Although a handful of authors wrote on intervention in the pre-Charter 
era,9 a relative explosion occurred around the time the British Parliament 
agreed to a proposal by the Canadian government that a Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms be incorporated into the Canadian Constitution. The surge 
can be traced to a few different sources,10 but none were as obvious as the 
modified role the Court would take on as a result of that constitutional 
moment. Generally speaking, judicial bodies are thought to serve either 
one of two functions in the wider political order: the first is an adjudicative 
function, where the task is to resolve conflicts between disputing parties 
by invoking a set of established legal norms and applying them to the 
case at hand; the second is an oversight function, where they are asked 
to review government action to ensure that it is in compliance with the 
constitutional commitments of a polity. While it would be misleading 
to suggest that Canadian courts only discharged the first function in the 
pre-Charter era, the authority they would enjoy under the second was 
significantly enhanced post-Charter. Peter Russell explains the shift in 
constitutional focus following the Charter’s enactment: 
Whereas [prior to the Charter] the courts in assessing constitutionality 
focused almost exclusively on the division of powers between the two 
levels of government, [in the post-Charter era] they are at least equally 
concerned with the constitutional rights of citizens against both levels 
of government. The consequences of finding legislation unconstitutional 
because it violates an individual’s constitutional rights would appear 
to be more drastic than finding legislation unconstitutional because it 
violates the federal division of powers. The former means that, unless 
the constitution is amended, no government may legislate in the 
proscribed area, whereas with the latter, what is excluded from one level 
of government will normally be within the jurisdiction of the other.11
9. See Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1974); Bernard M Dickens, “A Canadian Development: Non Party Intervention” (1977) 
40 Mod L Rev 666; James V West, Public Interest Groups and the Judicial Process in Canada: The 
Need for a More Realistic Jurisprudence (Thesis Dissertation, Carleton University, 1979).
10. I am thinking in particular of the changes that had been introduced in the mid-1970s in respect of 
the composition of the Court, as well as to the standards by which it would operate. For more on these 
changes see Brodie, supra note 5 at 25-28.
11. Peter H Russell, “The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian 
Courts” (1982) 25:1 Can Pub Ad 1 at 14.
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The decision to constitutionalize a rights document had the effect of 
significantly broadening the scope of the judicial oversight function. Not 
only would that function be to oversee (and resolve) constitutional disputes 
between the federal and provincial governments, but also it would extend 
to overseeing (and resolving) those disputes as they arose between the 
government and the individual citizen. This in turn greatly enhanced the 
ability of the courts to influence policy-related decisions. By having the 
power to invalidate a policy initiative undertaken by the government—
specifically through a declaration that it stood in violation of an individual’s 
(or group’s) Charter right—courts could issue determinations not only on 
which level of government had the authority to implement that initiative 
but also on the acceptability of the initiative itself. This was so even if a 
judicial determination stood contrary to the will of the provincial and/or 
federal legislatures.12
Naturally this transfer of political power caused an uproar in the legal 
community. While proponents celebrated the fact that minority groups 
would no longer be subject to the excessive forces of majority sentiment, 
critics denounced the move as an affront to democracy. Their concern was 
that because the will of the people could be usurped by the opinions of 
a few elite judges, the decision-making of the courts could no longer be 
considered democratically legitimate. 
It was as a response to this concern that a number of authors began to 
focus their attention on the merits of intervention. The structure of their 
arguments rested on two complementary claims. The descriptive claim, 
just reviewed in some detail, was that the Canadian political landscape 
was fundamentally altered by the Charter in a way that would allow the 
decisions of the courts to have a more profound and enduring influence. 
The prescriptive claim was that a shift in the procedure by which the courts 
rendered their decisions was not only appropriate, but imperative.
There is little doubt as to the validity of the descriptive claim. Section 
52 of the Charter provides that the Constitution has legal supremacy 
over all other law making devices in Canada,13 and section 24 identifies 
12. One important aspect in the debate over the legitimacy of the Canadian version of judicial 
review invokes s 33 of the Charter (‘the notwithstanding clause’) which holds that “Parliament or 
the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the 
case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in 
section 2 or sections 7 to 15.” This provision, at least facially, seems to preserve ultimate authority 
over law-making in Canada in Parliament (or the legislature of a province). I will not engage this 
debate here, except to note that many scholars consider s 33 to be at best a nominal feature of the 
Charter, both sparingly used and politically hazardous.
13. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 52, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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the judiciary as the relevant authority to determine whether a particular 
constitutional right has been infringed or denied.14 These devices together 
establish the kind of power discussed above: the Court has the authority to 
declare any law or government action to be “of no force and effect,” which 
in turn increases the influence the Court has over the political landscape.15
There is good reason to think the prescriptive claim is defensible as 
well. Although the notion of democracy is notoriously difficult to pin down, 
it requires a level of responsiveness on the part of a decision-making body 
to the will (or interests) of those who will be affected by its decisions. In 
this respect, democratic decision-making aligns closely with the idea of 
popular sovereignty, which holds that “the will of the people is distinct 
from and superior to the ordinary actions of government.”16 This presents 
a problem for judicial decision-making since courts are for the most part 
unelected and, in some senses at least, unaccountable to the public for 
the decisions they make. Framed in the context of the descriptive claim 
then—namely, that under the constitutionalization of a charter of rights 
many of those decisions will have direct ramifications over policy-related 
matters—the problem becomes acute. Given that questions of policy are 
inherently open to debate—being, as Robert Dahl says, “an effective 
choice among alternatives about which there is, at least initially, some 
uncertainty”17— placing judicial bodies in a position where they have the 
power to unilaterally resolve such questions seems to undermine notions 
of popular sovereignty, and in turn the wider commitments of a democratic 
polity.
The public stake in the outcome of judicial decisions generated 
commentary on intervention as a procedural mechanism to ensure the 
voices of those affected by the court’s decision might be heard. As Philip 
Bryden noted in an article written around that time, just as “politicians, 
government departments, and administrative agencies have created a wide 
range of formal and informal mechanisms for consulting those who are 
most substantially affected by their decisions,” intervention holds out the 
14. Ibid s 24.
15. The argument I am making here is of course not dependent on the existence of these provisions 
in particular; nor is it dependent on the constitutionalization of a charter of rights. The point is simply 
that the introduction of the Charter, and especially the powers outlined by ss 52 and 24, gave early 
writers on intervention an explicit and stable target to frame their democratically-inspired concerns. 
16. Kurt T Lash, “Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis” (2007) 93:6 Va 
L Rev 1437 at 1444. For more on the connection between democracy and popular sovereignty, 
see Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power” (2005) 12:2 
Constellations 223.
17. Robert A Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker” (1957) 6:2 J Pub L 279 at 279.
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same kind of promise for judicial bodies.18 What it provides, Alan Borovoy 
added, is a means by which “larger sectors of the community [will] be 
able to participate in the process which produces those decisions,”19 
offering the judiciary a way to countenance the democratic concerns the 
Charter seems to invoke. Of course, none of this is to say that these writers 
advocated that courts become Royal Commission-type bodies or that they 
issue determinations on the basis of popular sentiment alone. They merely 
suggested that courts should be willing to hear from those who stand 
to be affected by some judicial decision, with the aim of addressing the 
democracy deficit that might flow from the Court’s new role under the 
Charter. 
II. More recent contributions to the literature 
The two studies that explicitly focus on the Court’s use of intervention in 
the years following the post-Charter upsurge are those produced by Ian 
Brodie (in his book Friends of the Court) and Benjamin Alarie and Andrew 
Green (in their article “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada”). 
Unlike the earlier contributions to the literature, these works enjoyed a 
certain distance from the original “experimenting” the Court did with the 
practice, and in this respect are more grounded in empirical reasoning than 
earlier contributions. Nevertheless, the picture of intervention advanced 
by each work ends up being highly divergent. What led to the disparity? In 
what follows, I begin by looking at the paper by Alarie and Green (which 
is the more empirically-grounded of the two), and then at the theory 
developed by Ian Brodie (which paints a negative picture of the Court’s 
use of interventions).
1. Alarie and Green: the service interpretation 
Alarie and Green begin their examination by positing three candidate 
rationales that could account for the Court’s policy on intervention—
rationales they call “accuracy, affiliation, and acceptance.” The “accuracy 
rationale” maintains that the information provided by intervening parties 
“will increase the probability that an optimal disposition of the appeal will 
be reached.”20 On this rationale, intervenors are considered valuable to the 
extent that the Court can derive some assistance from them in executing its 
decision-making function. The “affiliation rationale,” on the other hand, 
takes an instrumental perspective of intervenors, seeing them as a means 
18. Bryden, supra note 7 at 506.
19. Alan Borovoy, “Interventions and the Public Interest (Open Letter to the Supreme Court of 
Canada)” in F L Morton, ed, Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2002) at 290.
20. Alarie, supra note 1 at 386.
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by which Justices may “vote directly in accordance with their [policy] 
preferences.”21 Here, the value of intervenors is the cover they provide for 
what might be considered a neglect of the Court’s function. Finally, the 
“acceptance rationale” holds that intervenor participation is a way that the 
Court can “promote the acceptance of [its] decisions through increased 
legitimacy.”22
In order to arrive at the likeliest candidate to explain the Court’s 
behaviour, the authors use two highly speculative methods of analysis 
based on the voting patterns that particular judges (and the Court as a 
whole) have developed over time. Since the acceptance rationale “would 
have required there to be no statistically significant relationship between 
the presence of intervenors (or particular types of intervenors) and the 
decision-making of the Court or particular judges”23 (which there was); 
and since “liberal or conservative judges are not particularly affected by 
intervenors with similar policy inclinations”24 (which cuts against the 
presuppositions of the affiliation rationale), the authors deduce that “the 
Court...appears to be using interventions to better understand the impacts 
of its decisions.”25 In other words, the conclusion the authors reach is 
that the accuracy rationale provides the best explanation for the liberal 
approach the Court has adopted in granting leave to interveners.
Even if the many inferences Alarie and Green rely on to arrive at this 
conclusion are accepted, two problems remain. The first relates to how 
the authors choose to frame their inquiry. Alarie and Green invoke data 
related exclusively to how intervention has affected the decision-making 
habits of Supreme Court Justices.26 This would indicate that the relevant 
question to be answered is not “why has the Court taken the particular tack 
it has on intervention?” but rather “how has the presence of intervening 
parties affected the decision-making of judges?” The latter is a perfectly 
legitimate question on its own (a number of comparable studies in the 
21. Ibid at 389.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid at 408.
24. Ibid at 408-409.
25. Ibid at 410.
26. Ibid at 391.
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U.S.27 and elsewhere28 have been designed on the basis of this question 
specifically); but more importantly, it is a conceptually distinct question 
from the one the authors claim to address in their paper.29 We can see this 
most clearly if we consider the different epistemic states that follow from 
each inquiry. Judges may only obscurely be aware of the effect intervening 
parties have over their voting behavior (the latter question), but they would 
surely be cognizant of their reasons for granting leave to such parties (the 
former question). For this reason, there is cause to challenge whether the 
purported target of Alarie and Green’s study is in fact the appropriate one.
What is more, there is a worry about how the accuracy rationale 
itself should be interpreted. Sometimes the authors describe the accuracy 
rationale in terms of “objectively useful information to the Court”30 from 
which the Court may produce “a better or more accurate decision;”31 in other 
cases the focus shifts to “the impacts of the decision on parties not before 
the court,”32 particularly in the service of increasing “the probability that 
an optimal disposition of the appeal will be reached.”33 These two senses 
of how intervenors may improve the accuracy of the Court’s decisions 
can be pulled apart, and this muddies the waters with respect to the 
conclusion the authors defend. On the former description, the impression 
is that the information intervenors provide can be used to improve the 
objective nature of the Court’s decisions, allowing it to dispense more 
accurate judgments “in the manner most consistent with the aims of the 
statute or case law as a whole.”34 On the latter description, there is at least 
a possibility that the nature of the information provided by intervenors will 
be used more expansively—in the vein, for instance, of giving the Court 
an indication of the subjective impact its decision will have over various 
27. See Paul M Collins, Jr, Pamela C Corley & Jesse Hammer, “The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on US Supreme Court Opinion Content” (2015) 49:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 917; Paul M Collins, 
Jr, “Lobbying Before the US Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs” 
(2007) 60:1 Pol Research Q 55; Paul M Collins, Jr, “Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence 
of Amicus Curiae Participation in US Supreme Court Litigation” (2004) 38:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 807; 
Joseph D Kearney & Thomas W Merrill, “The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme 
Court” (2000) 148:3 U Pa L Rev 743.
28. See Lorne Neudorf, “Intervention at the UK Supreme Court” (2013) 2:1 Cambridge J Int’l & 
Comp L 16; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO” 
(2001) 7 Widener L Symp J 82; George Williams, “The Amicus Curiae and Intervenor in the High 
Court of Australia: A Comparative Analysis” (2000) 28:3 Fed L Rev 365.
29. While there is some variability to the way Alarie and Green frame their study, their interest at 
bottom appears to be what their “results tell [them] about...why the Court may allow interventions” 
(Alarie, supra note 1 at 408).
30. Alarie, supra note 1 at 383.
31. Ibid at 386.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid at 388.
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non-implicated parties to the proceeding. So while the accuracy rationale 
can certainly be reduced to what Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill 
have called the “legal model of judicial decision-making”35—a reduction 
Alarie and Green appear ready to accept36—there is no reason to think 
that it must. On its face at least, the rationale can apply to both a legalistic 
conception of judicial decision-making, and to a conception that is more 
open to policy-responsiveness on the part of the Court. Quite probably, it is 
a rationale that is best explained as involving a blend of both—especially 
when the common law framework the Court uses to render its judgments is 
factored in. And while it is perfectly acceptable to adopt a composite view 
of how the Court receives information that is provided by intervenors, 
it is also something that ought to be addressed if the aim is to advance a 
normative understanding of the Court’s approach to the practice.
I explain in short order the fuller rationale behind this assertion, but 
before I do, I describe the competing account Ian Brodie advances in his 
book on intervention, as it relies quite heavily on the distinction Alarie and 
Green eschew in their paper.
2. Brodie: the strategic interpretation
Brodie’s explanation for why the SCC has taken the tack it has on 
intervention arises from the same post-Charter tension that fueled much 
of the early writing on the subject. Unlike the favourable assessment those 
authors offered, Brodie is more hostile to the practice. At the center of his 
assessment is a ‘“conundrum” he claims the Court faced in the light of 
the increased policy-making role it took on as the final arbiter of rights 
claims—one that forced it to choose between either (1) “the legalistic 
argument,” which holds that “courts do not make law when they interpret 
the Constitution [but are rather] engaged in a mechanical process of 
‘discovering’ principles of constitutional law that already exist in the 
document itself,”37 or (2) “the political disadvantage theory,”38 which 
holds that without the protection of a superior adjudicative body operating 
above the fray of majoritarian politics, the rights belonging to historically 
disadvantaged groups are vulnerable to being trenched upon. In response 
to this conundrum, Brodie explains the Court’s approach to intervention 
as strategically motivated:
Why did the Court adopt the position of lobbyists so decisively?….It is 
important to recall the broader background to this development. During 
35. Kearney, supra note 29.
36. Alarie, supra note 1 at 387-388.
37. Brodie, supra note 5 at 59.
38. Ibid at ch 1.
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the early and mid-1980s the Supreme Court used its power of judicial 
review more actively than it ever had before. It staked out bold new 
ground using the Charter, placing no significant limits on its own powers 
to review government actions and replace the judgment of government 
officials with its own. No court can do such a thing for long without 
the support of political interests. Just as the Trudeau government found 
civil liberties and rights oriented groups useful allies for legitimating its 
patriation project, so the Supreme Court found these groups to be useful 
allies in legitimating its extraordinary activism. By accommodating 
interest groups, the Court blunted their potentially damaging criticism. 
Allying itself with ‘disadvantaged groups’ furthermore provided a 
justification for what otherwise might appear to be an unconscionable 
power grab.39
Brodie interprets the SCC’s decision to liberalize the practice of intervention 
as a means by which it could bolster the legitimacy of its activist turn. 
Because the only available justification for the “unconscionable power 
grab” the Court initiated in the post-Charter era was to draw attention to 
its role as “defender of disadvantaged groups,” it was thereby impelled to 
win the support of those groups, which it ultimately did by capitulating to 
pleas that the practice of intervention be made more accessible. 
Brodie’s analysis emerges from a particular way of interpreting 
the historical circumstances around the Court’s decision to liberalize 
the practice of intervention. Earlier arguments drew attention to the 
democratic appropriateness of the Court adopting a more liberal approach 
to the practice; in contrast, Brodie suggests that the Court’s decision is 
explained by a questionable anti-democratic agenda. His claim is that by 
choosing to increase interest group involvement in its decision-making 
process, the Court at best substituted the will of the Canadian people for a 
discrete and insular sample of it (what I will call “the weaker iteration” of 
Brodie’s narrative), and at worst erected a smokescreen by which it could 
conceal its policy-making activities from the wider population (what I will 
call “the stronger iteration” of that narrative). Both of these allegations are 
troubling and, if true, present ample reason to question just how viable the 
Court’s increasingly liberal approach to intervention really is.40 
I suggest an alternative that puts the historical record on which Brodie 
relies in a more sympathetic light. This requires focusing on three aspects 
39. Ibid at 47-48.
40. Of note is that Brodie remains agnostic on which of these iterations is more credible. His official 
position is that: “By importing the concept of disadvantaged groups into its jurisprudence, [the Court] 
gained those groups as allies. Whether this maneuver was deliberate or the inadvertent byproduct of 
the Court’s decisions, the rhetoric of the disadvantaged group insulates the Court from criticisms of its 
activism.” (Ibid at xvii).
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of Brodie’s story in more detail. For the first, I return to why Alarie and 
Green’s use of the accuracy rationale is not as straightforward as presented. 
Although it is of course possible that, as the authors claim, the Court uses 
intervention primarily to improve the accuracy of its decision-making, 
I earlier highlighted an equivocation that surfaces when applying that 
rationale in the context of judicial decisions. The question was whether the 
information provided by intervenors should be thought to contribute to (1) 
the Court’s ability to render a more accurate legal judgement, understood 
from the point of view of legal principles; or instead as contributing to (2) 
its ability to deliver a better legal judgment, understood from the point 
of view of the ramifications the judgment will have for stakeholders. It 
is this very distinction that Brodie seems to embrace as the grounding 
insight for his negative assessment of the Court’s use of intervention. 
His work suggests that if the Court were really committed to restricting 
its role to (1)—what he calls “the legalistic argument”—there would be 
little reason to allow intervenor participation at all. His suggestion is that 
“[a]n adjudicative court can depend on the [litigating] parties to bring any 
relevant information to its attention,”41 and that any information that might 
“slip through the cracks” will be caught by “the services of a reasonably 
competent bar and clerks.”42 On the other hand, if the Court were to take a 
broader view of its place in the political order—one that accepts its role as 
policy-maker, for instance—it could not similarly “trust the parties to the 
case to bring forward all the types of information that it needs.”43 Instead, 
and for the reasons outlined by early writers on the subject, it would have 
to rely on the same range of procedural resources that are available to 
more typical policy-making bodies (e.g., committee hearings, fact finding 
missions, etc.).
Brodie’s line of reasoning on this score captures well my reservations 
about the reliability of the conclusion reached by Alarie and Green. The 
distinction that seems to be operating in the background of what they call 
“the accuracy rationale” calls into question just how robustly that rationale 
can be used toward a meaningful assessment of the Court’s approach to 
the practice. One would think, for example, that a court that believes 
intervenors serve it in the legalistic sense depicted by (1) would restrict 
access to only those parties whose intervening briefs could be said to 
introduce new and useful information to the legal dispute in question, as 
well as prohibit intervening parties from straying even minimally from 
41. Ibid at 53.
42. Ibid at 61.
43. Ibid at 54.
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the core of that dispute. A court that believed intervenors serve it in the 
canvassing way depicted by (2), on the other hand, would be far more 
open to any kind of intervening submission, provided of course that it 
did not deviate too widely from the issue at hand. As a matter of fact, the 
SCC’s rules and conduct concerning intervention betray elements of both 
tendencies, and this undermines the value we can glean from Alarie and 
Green’s blanket conclusion that the Court uses intervention as a means 
to arrive at more accurate decisions. Unless we can distinguish the sense 
in which a decision is understood to be “accurate” in the first place, the 
conclusion the authors reach tells us little about whether the specific way 
the practice is being implemented is a genuine reflection of the Court’s 
aims. 
So there are problems with embracing Alarie and Green’s assessment 
as it stands. A convincing account of why the accuracy rationale is the 
likeliest candidate to explain the Court’s approach to intervention would 
at the very least require a more thorough discussion of what it implies. 
But Alarie and Green’s study does give us reason to reject the stronger 
iteration of Brodie’s narrative, which is that the Court uses intervention 
as a cover to implement its own policy-making agenda. As the authors 
convincingly explain, for the stronger iteration of Brodie’s narrative to be 
true one would expect to see the voting patterns of partisan judges align 
with intervening submissions of the same general type. In other words: 
“if...in cases involving liberal intervenors, a liberal judge tends to have a 
higher liberal voting percentage than in other cases, it may be evidence...
that the liberal judges are receiving information that accords with their 
policy preferences...”44 But this is simply not the case. The results of 
Alarie and Green’s research indicate rather “that liberal or conservative 
judges (as measured by the party of the appointing prime minister or by 
the judge’s ideal point score) are not particularly affected by intervenors 
with similar policy inclinations,”45 and this strongly suggests that there 
is no veiled intent behind the Court’s approach to or use of intervenor 
participation.  
So there are challenges with accepting the stronger iteration of 
Brodie’s narrative as well. But these same considerations cannot be used to 
repudiate the weaker version of that narrative, which is that by embracing 
a policy-making role at all, the SCC risks a legitimacy crisis.46 The way 
44. Alarie, supra note 1 at 392.
45. Ibid at 409.
46. Brodie writes: “the Court cannot [both] admit its political role [and avoid] a loss in its legitimacy.” 
(Brodie, supra note 5 at 51).
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Brodie frames this weaker iteration is to place it in the context of interest 
group–Court relations, his suggestion being that the Court’s acquiescence 
to certain left-leaning groups early in the Charter era has resulted in a 
stratified, and thus undemocratic, influence within that particular decision-
making arena.47 On this weaker iteration, intervention is not viewed as a 
cover by which the Court executes its own policy-making agenda, but as a 
means by which special interest groups—specifically those that promote a 
liberal agenda—can utilize the Court to execute theirs. 
If this weaker version of Brodie’s narrative is indicative of the way 
the Court has designed its approach to intervention, it would be just as 
problematic as the stronger version. However, there is reason to question 
its viability. To ground his argument, Brodie cites a trilogy of cases48 
(where leave was granted by one intervenor-friendly justice Sopinka) and 
four other cases49 to demonstrate the unwillingness of the Court to apply 
the same rules to their conservative counterparts. Choosing such a small 
sample risks skewed results. What is more, when one takes a broader 
view of the facts around which groups have and have not been granted 
leave to intervene, the position Brodie advocates turns out to be baseless. 
According to Alarie and Green’s research,50 for example, from 2000 to 
2008 no discrete group suffered a success rate at obtaining leave below 
76 per cent, and most enjoyed a success rate in excess of 90 per cent. 
And although school boards (100 per cent) and environmental groups (98 
per cent) did enjoy the highest success rates of all, the next highest rate 
(outside of attorneys general) belonged to government interests (97 per 
cent)—scarcely a progressive faction. Furthermore, public interest groups 
(87 per cent), unions (87 per cent), religious groups (87 per cent) and public 
advocacy law (89 per cent)—all of which align across partisan lines—
enjoyed among the lowest rates of success, eclipsed only by individuals 
(76 per cent). One can speculate as to why the Court treated each of these 
groups as it did (both in the individual cases and as a general trend), but 
the fuller numbers do not support the view that the Court privileges liberal 
47. As Brodie writes: “it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Court plays favorites with interest 
groups. Favored groups can intervene when they wish and bend cases to raise the issues they want 
raised. Other groups have difficulty getting in the door.” (ibid at 71).
48. Namely, Reference re Worker’s Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld) (Application to Intervene), 
[1989] 2 SCR 335, [1989] SCJ No 113 (QL); M(K) v M(H), [1992] 3 SCR 3, 1991 CanLII 13 (SCC); 
and, Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 224, 1991 CanLII 7424 (SCC).
49. Namely, Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211, 81 DLR (4th) 
545; R v Zundel, [1992] 2 SCR 731, 95 DLR (4th) 202; R v Finta, [1993] 1 SCR 1138, 1993 CanLII 
132 (SCC); and, R v Morgentaler, [1993] 1 SCR 462, 1993 CanLII 158 (SCC).
50. The statistics can all be found at Alarie, supra note 1 at 399.
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intervenors over conservative ones. Instead, the evidence suggests that, 
from a partisan standpoint, the Court is even with its grants of leave. 
Brodie’s narrative on intervention seems to reflect his more general 
repudiation of the Court’s policy-making role under the Charter. But 
whether the Court is justified in embracing this role is open to debate. 
Brodie interprets the Court’s relationship to intervention as betraying 
either deception (the stronger iteration) or partiality (the weaker iteration), 
but there is another interpretation available that would view that 
relationship in a more favourable light. Indeed, by using the same set of 
facts upon which Brodie relies, one can imagine the Court’s intervention 
decisions not as an attempt to legitimate its political activism, nor even as 
a promotion of one partisan cause over another, but rather as an attempt to 
strike the best or most reasonable balance among competing democratic 
considerations. Too often Brodie’s narrative implies that the Court was 
given a choice between the diametrically opposed roles of ‘legalistically’ 
interpreting existing law and ‘politically’ making new law, and that 
whichever choice the Court embraced would preclude the other. But there 
is no reason to think that these were the terms upon which that choice 
was made. In theory, a wide spectrum exists between the two roles for a 
constitutional court. Attempting to strike a reasonable balance between 
those poles might appear to be an appropriate course for the Court to take, 
especially considering the practical realities under which such courts are 
bound to operate. 
III. The democratic balancing interpretation
Though available to the Court as early as 1900,51 intervention was seldom 
used as a procedural device until the mid-1970s when new rules that had 
been applied to the Court52 precipitated a substantial shift in the Court’s 
attitude toward the practice. In particular, a decision by the Trudeau 
government to abolish the right of appeal clause for cases involving more 
than $10,000 gave the Court far more control over its docket, which led 
to an increasing focus on public law disputes.53 Between 1976 and 1982 
thirty-five non-government intervenors were granted leave to participate 
in appeals before the SCC—a number that exceeded the total in the 
category prior to that date.54 The trend continued in the first two years 
51. Martin L Friedland, A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the Development of 
Canadian Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
52. Russell, supra note 11 at 98-99.
53. For a good summary of this period in the Court’s relationship to intervenors see Brodie, supra 
note 5 at 22-28.
54. Ibid at 27.
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of the Charter era—the Court granting an additional thirty-three parties 
leave to intervene55—but took an unexpected turn after that. Instead of 
expanding its approach to intervention further, or even adhering to the 
same gradual pattern it had established over the prior decade, the Court 
appeared to recoil from the practice altogether, allowing only nine non-
government intervenors to participate in the crucial formative years of 
1985 and 1986.56 It wasn’t until a court-appointed  liaison committee, 
specifically assembled to investigate the matter, returned its report that 
the number of intervenors began to increase again.57 The upshot of that 
report, as committee chairman, Brian Crane, wrote in a memo at the time, 
was that the Court ought to modify its rules on intervention “so that public 
interest groups will have an opportunity to put forward their views.”58 
From 1987 onwards intervenor participation increased at an impressive 
rate—both in respect of the amount of applications filed with the Court, 
as well as the percentage of applicants granted leave59—and, as stated in 
the Introduction, today nearly 60 per cent of appeals feature at least one 
nongovernment intervenor, with the Court granting leave almost 90 per 
cent of the time. 
On its face, this record seems to support the weaker iteration of Brodie’s 
narrative on intervention. After all, it was only subsequent to interest 
group lobbying that the Court appeared interested in appointing a liaison 
committee to investigate the matter,60 and this suggests that the catalyst for 
that decision was specifically to assuage interest group concern. But what 
a general account of the events around intervention ignores are the many 
nuances that attended each phase of this development, and these serve to 
complicate Brodie’s story significantly. 
1. Incompatibility and disparity in the Court’s early actions on 
intervention
Consider first the noticeable incompatibility between the rules the Court 
used to regulate the practice of admitting intervenors early in the post-
55. Ibid at 37.
56. Ibid.
57. Report of the Canadian Bar Association—Supreme Court of Canada Liaison Committee, 22 
October 1986, vol 142, file 12.
58. More specifically, the committee “reached a consensus that the rules should be modified to permit 
written interventions, by leave of a judge, so that public interest groups will have the opportunity to 
put forward their views in writing. Oral participation by intervenants should still be allowed in special 
circumstances where the participation of an intervenant is especially important for the hearing of 
the appeal.” (Brian Crane, “CBA Supreme Court of Canada Liaison Committee Mid-Winter Report” 
(Paper delivered to the Canadian Bar Association’s Governing Council, February 1987)).
59. Brodie, supra note 5 at 37 table 2.1.
60. Ibid at 32-36.
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Charter period and the way it behaved on the basis of those rules. In 1983, 
for example, after making no changes to the practice of intervention in 
the previous 76 years,61 the Court instituted two new rules,62 one of which 
gave parties that had intervened in a court below an immediate grant of 
leave to appear before the SCC. This rule seemed to indicate a change 
of approach for third party intervenors, perhaps even to the point where 
they were considered an important feature of the SCC’s wider adjudicative 
process. But the Court’s subsequent behavior did not bear this impression 
out. Almost immediately after the rule came into effect, a modification 
was issued by Ritchie J in Ogg-Moss v The Queen63 that excluded its 
application to criminal proceedings, and this was followed a few weeks 
later by a complete moratorium on the rule.64
A few years later, the Court once more adjusted the formal rules 
around intervention, only this time in the direction of making them more 
rigid.65 Two additions were introduced, the first requiring that an applicant 
state their interest in the appeal as well as the grounds “for believing that 
the submissions will be useful to the Court and different from those of the 
parties,”66 and the second imposing limits on both the length of intervening 
factums (20 pages) and the conditions under which an intervening party 
may make an oral argument (exclusively by judicial order).67 In reverse 
fashion to the earlier change, these modifications suggested that the Court 
was interested in cutting down access to third party intervenors, viewing 
their participation as more peripheral to its decision-making. Once again, 
however, the Court’s subsequent behaviour did not bear this impression 
out. After instituting these modifications, the Court became increasingly 
permissive with respect to intervenors, granting access to 88 per cent of 
all nongovernment applications between 1987 and 1991,68 which is a trend 
that has continued. 
Consider next the disparity the Court demonstrated concerning which 
parties were granted leave in the early Charter years, as well as the types 
of cases in which intervenors were permitted.69 In Guerin v The Queen, 
61. Ibid at 32.
62. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment, SOR/1983-74: Rule 32 entitled attorneys-
general to intervene in constitutional cases as of right, while Rule 18(2) extended that same entitlement 
to nongovernment intervenors who had intervened in a court below.
63. Ogg-Moss v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 171, 1983 CanLII 139 (SCC).
64. Notice to the Profession, [1984] SCCB 24; Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment, 
SOR/1983-930.
65. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment, SOR/87-292.
66. Ibid at r 18(3)(c).
67. Ibid at r 18(5).
68. Brodie, supra note 5 at 37.
69. Katherine Swinton goes so far to call the Court’s policy on intervention during this period 
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a case about Indigenous treaty rights, Laskin CJ permitted the National 
Indian Brotherhood to participate as an intervening party,70 but denied 
leave to the Treaty 8 Trial Association.71 In Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Skapinker, the first Charter case to feature an intervenor application, Beetz 
J granted leave to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada,72 but denied 
it to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association73 (CCLA) in the second 
case (R v Marlene Moore). Wilson J granted leave to various provincial 
commissions74 in Canadian Human Rights Commission and Bhinder 
v CNR but not to the Canadian Association of Provincial Judges in R v 
Valente.75 Perhaps most strikingly, Dickson CJ denied leave to the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church in one of the first freedom of religion cases (R v Big 
M Drug Mart),76 while Estey J denied leave to the CCLA in an important 
freedom of expression case (Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation 
Society v Ontario Board of Censors et al)77 and LeDain J denied leave to 
both the Maritime Employers Association and Western Terminals Ltd in a 
landmark freedom of association case (Retail, Wholesale and Department 
Store Union Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd).78 
These disparities of application suggest that the Court was using a 
pigeon-hole approach to determine who was and was not fit to intervene, 
seeming once more to align with the strategic narrative defended by 
Brodie. However, I want to suggest a different theory. My hypothesis is 
that the uneven behaviour the SCC exhibited in the early Charter years is 
not evidence of a predetermined agenda on its part, nor even of a Court 
that lacked a sense of purpose with respect to the practice, but rather a 
predictable, and even fitting, response to an instrument that of its own 
nature generates two important democratic concerns—the first to do with 
the procedural efficiency of the Court, and the second with the Court’s 
accountability to the public. When we factor in these considerations, an 
“both erratic and arbitrary.” in Katherine E Swinton, The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian 
Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 72. A fuller account of the history 
is available in Welch, supra note 7 at 217-223.
70. Guerin v The Queen, [1983] SCCB 307 (motion for leave to intervene).
71. Guerin v The Queen, [1983] SCCB 323 (motion for leave to intervene).
72. Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1983] SCCB 437 (motion for leave to intervene).
73. R v Marlene Moore, [1983] SCCB 439 (motion for leave to intervene).
74. Canadian Human Rights Commission and Bhinder v CNR, [1983] SCCB 756 (motion for leave 
to intervene).
75. R v Valente, [1983] SCCB 837 (motion for leave to intervene).
76. R v Big M Drug Mart, [1984] SCCB 79 (motion for leave to intervene).
77. Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v Ontario Board of Censors et al, [1984] SCCB 
788 (motion for leave to intervene).
78. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1984] 
SCCB 912 (motion for leave to intervene).
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equally plausible explanation for the Court’s unpredictable behaviour in 
the early Charter years has less to do with justifying its new role as policy-
maker than it does with an attempt to strike a reasonable balance between 
the conflicting aspects internal to the practice of intervention itself.
2. Balancing democratic considerations
Consider first how the incompatibility between the rules the Court instituted 
on intervention and its subsequent behaviour could be interpreted as an 
attempt to address certain democratic tensions inherent to the practice. 
Jillian Welch suggests that the 1983 rule change that gave intervening 
parties in lower courts immediate permission to intervene before the SCC 
was likely instituted as a time-saving measure;79 Brodie offers a second 
explanation, which is that the change was due to the Court’s uneasiness 
with the policy-making role it had adopted as a consequence of the 
Charter.80 These explanations are not incompatible in theory, as both allude 
to the reservations the Court would have had concerning the influence 
intervention might carry over the efficiency of its operating procedure. As 
former Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, Warren Burger, declared: if 
confidence in the court system is eroded, then confidence in societal order 
follows:
A sense of confidence in the courts is essential to maintain the fabric 
of ordered liberty for a free people and three things could destroy that 
confidence and do incalculable damage to society: that people come 
to believe that inefficiency and delay will drain even a just judgment 
of its value; that people who have long been exploited in the smaller 
transactions of daily life come to believe that courts cannot vindicate 
their legal rights from fraud and over-reaching; that people come to 
believe the law—in the larger sense—cannot fulfill its primary function 
to protect them and their families in their homes, at their work, and on 
the public streets.81
The general thrust of Burger’s argument is that unless citizens can be 
assured that justice will be administered in a timely and effective manner, 
confidence in the system will begin to wilt. And since democracy is more 
or less based on the people’s enduring confidence in the institutions that 
79. Welch, supra note 7 at 216-217.
80. Brodie writes that: “[a]nother possible explanation [to Welch’s] is that the Court’s reluctance 
to hear intervenors in these early Charter years also flowed from its own conception of judicial 
supremacy.” (supra note 5 at 59).
81. Warren E Burger, “What’s Wrong With the Courts: The Chief Justice Speaks Out” (1970) 69 US 
News & World Report (Address to American Bar Association meeting, 10 August 1970).
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govern them,82 a crisis in one could translate to a crisis in the other.83 In 
this sense, it is only natural that the SCC would have taken a cautious, 
and even a provisionary, attitude toward the rules around intervention 
in the early Charter years. At the time, the Court would have been only 
beginning to be aware of the implications intervention would have on both 
its time and effectiveness, and thus a “learning phase,” where the Court 
would try to discover the best or most efficient way to utilize that tool, was 
to be both expected and desired. 
The same kind of reasoning can be used to explain the disparity in how 
the Court chose to administer grants of leave, only this time with respect to 
the idea of accountability. The relationship between judicial accountability 
and judicial independence is a complex one. Although there is truth to 
the view that, as former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin once noted, 
“any system of accountability for judges must take judicial independence 
as a necessary condition,”84 a rather deep tension lies at the core of each 
concept. Judicial independence is about keeping the judiciary free of 
any undue pressure from outsiders; judicial accountability is about the 
judiciary’s ultimate responsibility to the public. The question is: how can a 
judiciary free of any outside influence ultimately be said to be accountable 
to the public?
The answer lies in the instrumental value promoted by each concept—
both aim to ensure that the judiciary is beholden to the rule of law rather 
than to its own, or to another’s, partisan agenda. This offers the salient 
link between judicial accountability and judicial independence. Being 
accountable to the public requires issuing decisions in a way that responds 
to the function the judiciary is intended to serve in a liberal democratic 
order. Discharging that function successfully is conditional on the 
judiciary’s ability to apply the law impartially and fairly. This in turn 
requires a degree of independence from the other branches of government 
82. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “it is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions 
of a country” (Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970) at 41). For a broad defense 
of this general idea, see Sonja Zmerli, Kenneth Newton, & Jose Ramon Montero, “Trust in People, 
Confidence in Political Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy” in Jan W van Deth, Jose 
Ramon Montero & Anders Westholm, eds, Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A 
Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2007) at 35.
83. Beverley McLachlin CJ recently said as much, noting that “if people do not have confidence in 
the courts, they will not support them.” (Beverley McLachlin, “The Decline of Democracy and the Rule 
of Law: How to Preserve the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence?” (Remarks at Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba Courts of Appeal Joint Meeting, 28 September 2017), online: Supreme Court of Canada 
<www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2017-09-28-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/V85T-RKZS]).
84. Beverly McLachlin, “Judicial Accountability” (Remarks at the Conference on Law and 
Parliament, 2 November 2006), online: Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/
spe-dis/bm-2006-11-02-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/7VBP-TPZ2].
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which, as elected bodies, are more likely to make decisions on the basis 
of popular sentiment or interest group pressure. In this sense, as Stephen 
Burbank has noted, the two concepts are but “different sides of the same 
coin.”85
The relationship between judicial accountability and judicial 
independence appears to challenge even the limited role intervenors might 
serve in judicial proceedings, and this could well have played some part in 
the uneven behaviour exhibited by the Court in the early Charter period. 
The concern would have been that granting too many (or any) outside 
parties participatory access to court proceedings was a slippery slope 
toward undermining the impartiality of the Court, and this in turn would 
have weakened the Court’s democratic responsibilities to the public from 
an accountability standpoint. Chabot J’s strong words in the 1988 decision 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v Canada (A.G.) capture this concern: “[i]t is 
fundamentally repugnant to this Court to import into judicial proceedings 
even the concept of the legitimacy of judicial decisions, which in the end 
could not but sap judicial authority in its most fundamental democratic 
guarantee, the independence of the judiciary.”86 Just as the Court showed 
unease in regulating the practice of interventions to ensure procedural 
effectiveness, a degree of inconsistency was bound to surface in how it 
dealt with intervening parties on a case-by-case basis. As its task was 
to find the best balance concerning a practice that possessed opposing 
features to its own unique institutional responsibilities, a learning phase 
was to be expected whereby the Court could come to better understand 
how the relatively unknown practice of intervention would impact that 
balance.
Interpreting the Court’s early actions around intervention as an 
attempt to balance competing democratic considerations presents a viable 
alternative to Brodie’s suggestion that the practice was used as a way to 
legitimate the Court’s policy-making agenda. Where the interpretation 
I have provided becomes especially compelling however is when we 
consider it in the context of more recent Court behaviour, which I argue 
reflects a tension between the rules by which the practice of intervention 
is designed and the practical way the Court has chosen to implement those 
rules. My suggestion is that this tension makes better sense if conceived as 
an exercise in democratic balancing.
85. Stephen B Burbank, “The Architecture of Judicial Independence” (1999) 72:2&3 S Cal L Rev 
315 at 339.
86. Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Canada (AG), [1988] 55 DLR (4th) 555 at 571, 1988 CanLII 5719 (QC 
CS).
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3. Rule creation versus rule application
Four rules have governed the practice of third party intervention for the 
past several decades. Potential intervenors must:
(1) describe their interest in the proceeding, as well as any prejudice 
they would suffer if their intervention were denied;87
(2) identify the position they wish to support with respect to the 
proceeding, and explain how their submissions are uniquely 
relevant to it;88
(3) not raise any new issues to the proceeding (unless otherwise 
ordered by a judge);89 and
(4) not make any statement concerning the outcome of the appeal 
(unless otherwise ordered by a judge).90 
On paper, these rules set a high bar for being granted leave to intervene. 
The rule that seems particularly onerous is the one that would have 
intervening parties explain how their submissions are uniquely relevant 
to the proceeding, coupled with a restriction on the opportunity to raise 
any new issues. As Brodie explains in his book, one would think that 
modern courts of law should be able to “depend on the parties to bring any 
relevant information to its attention,”91 and thus that successful grants of 
leave would be a rare occurrence. But precisely the opposite is the case. 
Parties seeking leave to intervene are usually successful, and this implies 
that either: (1) the vast majority of intervening submissions add something 
new and useful to the proceeding (all the while staying well within the 
boundaries of the issues at hand); or (2) the Court allows a good deal of 
leeway when enforcing the rules in practice. 
There is reason to believe (2) provides a much better explanation for 
the Court’s behaviour than (1). Notwithstanding the intuitive plausibility 
of Brodie’s claim about the resources available to modern courts, when 
we turn to the cases themselves—in particular, to the similarities that 
exist between intervening submissions in highly represented cases—the 
point becomes compelling. Take, for instance, the factums prepared by the 
Shibogama First Nations Council, the Central Coast Indigenous Reserve 
Alliance, and the Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council in Ktunaxa Nation 
v British Columbia92—a case about indigenous land use rights for spiritual 
87. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, r 57(1).
88. Ibid at r 57(2)
89. Ibid at r 59.
90. Ibid at r 42.
91. Brodie, supra note 5 at 53. “Parties” can include both litigating parties as well as the services of 
a reasonable competent bar and clerks (ibid at 61).
92. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 
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purposes. Each of these factums was organized around the importance 
that non-traditional sacred spaces play in the robust enjoyment of one’s 
religious practice, and ultimately advanced the position that section 2(a) 
of the Charter should be read in that light. Similarly in Carter v Canada,93 
where a challenge was issued to Canada’s criminal prohibition against 
assisted dying, the factums prepared by the Catholic Health Alliance, the 
Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada, and the Catholic Civil 
Rights League all focused on the legal claim that a decision to invalidate the 
prohibition would trench on the protected rights of faith-based healthcare 
providers. The same trend is repeated in Loyola High School v Quebec,94 
Google v Equustek Solutions,95 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v 
British Columbia,96 and in a number of other high-profile cases. In each 
instance, trying to discern how the arguments presented by certain factums 
differed in any significant sense from those presented by others would be 
an exercise in mental gymnastics—and this is to say nothing of whether 
they introduced perspectives or points of law not already represented by 
either party to the case.
The overlap featured in these and other cases invites us to ask the 
following question: why does the Court continue to operate under the 
strict formal conditions it does when in practice they seem only nominally 
relevant to its decision to grant leave? I believe the democratic balancing 
interpretation offers an especially good explanation. Retaining rules 
that are formally strict enough should the practice of intervention begin 
to compromise the procedural values lying at the core of the judicial 
institution has given the Court license to adopt a strikingly liberal approach 
to how those rules are applied. This in turn allows the Court to pay heed to 
different rationales for granting participatory leave depending on the type 
of fact pattern or situation on appeal, as well as the implications it believes 
its decision will have for society. It may be the case, for instance, that, as 
Alarie and Green posit, the Court considers an intervening submission 
valuable because it increases the likelihood that a judgment will better 
SCC 54.
93. Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5.
94. Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12. Among others, there was significant overlap 
in the factums prepared by the Christian Legal Fellowship, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the 
Catholic Civil Rights League, the Canadian Council of Christian Charities.
95. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34. There was significant overlap in the factums 
prepared by the Wikimedia Foundation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, OpenMedia Engagement 
Network, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. 
96. British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2016 SCC 49. There was significant 
overlap in the factums prepared by the Coalition of Ontario Teacher Affiliates, the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada, and the Canadian Labour Congress.
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reflect the relevant legal principles. This might arise when the Court 
believes it could use assistance in making sense of highly technical fact 
patterns, as may be the case in disputes over intellectual property, data 
security, and the like. Alternatively, and harkening to earlier literature on 
the subject, it may grant leave simply because it believes there is an all-
things-considered democratic benefit to doing so. We witness a perfect 
example of this latter rationale in the Court’s recent decision to reverse 
Wagner J’s order to deny leave to a number of LGBTQ groups in a pair of 
Trinity Western cases that touched on the issue of sexual-orientation-based 
discrimination.97 Although Wagner J went on record to confirm that he 
“was convinced that some intervenors for which I accepted the application 
in fact will convey the interests, preoccupations and concerns of members 
of the LGBTQ,” after discussing the issue with then Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachlin, the Court “decided that it would be best to add another day, 
and have all the applications granted.”98 
If we were to assess this reversal against the strategic narrative 
proposed by Brodie, we would likely regard the move as more evidence 
that the Court uses intervention as a means to promote its own institutional 
legitimacy. But for the reasons already expressed, this seems an unlikely 
explanation for the Court’s behaviour. The alternative I have proposed 
suggests Wagner J’s reversal is instead an acknowledgment that in this 
particular instance the initial decision failed to strike a suitable balance 
between the democratic value of granting participatory leave versus the 
cost to other relevant values that would be suffered on the basis of not 
doing so. Or to put the point slightly differently, even though the LGBTQ 
groups in question did not meet the formal criteria set out by the Court 
with respect to obtaining intervenor status, the fact that their participation 
would not have unduly affected the Court’s impartial judgement, nor have 
been an excessive strain on the Court’s effective operation, meant that the 
balance of democratic values was in this case best struck on the side of 
allowing participation. 
The democratic balancing interpretation I have proposed is 
fundamentally grounded on the value inherent to participation itself, and 
it vindicates early arguments that called for just this kind of approach to 
intervention. It also impugns how that value is represented in the two 
97. The cases in question are Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 
SCC 32; and Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33. The order to 
deny leave was issued on 27 July 2017.
98. Sean Fine, “Supreme Court justice offers explanation for LGBTQ decision,” The Globe and 
Mail (2 August 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/supreme-court-justice-
offers-explanation-for-lgbtq-decision/article35870614/> [perma.cc/N4UN-E295].
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later works on the practice. Consider, for instance, how Alarie and Green 
represent the value of participation. Although the authors recognize 
that judges may “wish to allow intervenors, even if they add no useful 
information, if they believe there is a need to ensure that whatever the 
‘correct’ answer is, it requires that the parties feel it is legitimate,” they 
also assert that, “[this kind of] explanation seems to accord most closely 
with a strategic view of judicial behavior [whereby] judges make decisions 
(including whether to allow outside parties to intervene) in order to further 
their policy preferences...”99 In other words, to Alarie and Green, the notion 
that the Court may grant intervenor status on any basis other than a belief 
that the submissions will help to bring about a more accurate decision 
collapses into the kind of strategic narrative advanced by Brodie. But for 
the reasons I have outlined, there is no reason to think that such a conflation 
is necessary. Rather than viewing participation through the skeptical lens 
that both Alarie and Green and Brodie employ, we may interpret it instead 
as a nod to the democratic value earlier writers on intervention considered 
so compelling. Philip Bryden’s view reflects the importance those authors 
placed on participation:
...the willingness of courts to listen to intervenors is a reflection of the 
value that judges attach to people. Our commitment to a right to hearing 
and public participation in governmental decision-making is derived not 
only from the belief that we improve the accuracy of decisions when we 
allow people to present their side of the story, but also from our sense that 
participation is necessary to preserve human dignity and self-respect.100 
Bryden makes two points in this passage, and both are vital to a non-
strategic way of viewing the participatory role intervenors may play in 
a court proceeding. The first and more obvious is to draw attention to 
the inherent value in the act of participating itself—a value that extends 
beyond any instrumental or strategic ends that might be served by such 
participation. The second and more crucial point is that the reason judges 
might allow intervenor participation in the first place is precisely because 
they acknowledge the normative significance of this value. This shifts 
the focus away from the kind of strategic motivation Alarie and Green 
attach to the rationale toward a normative grounding for it. Why would 
the SCC allow intervenor participation even in circumstances where such 
participation is likely to have little to no effect over the ultimate decision 
it will render? It is not necessarily to ensure that intervening parties will 
99. Alarie, supra note 1 at 391.
100. Bryden, supra note 7 at 509.
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“‘buy into’ a particular decision,”101 nor even “to increase the sense of the 
legitimacy of the process as a whole,”102 but because the Court has itself 
“bought into” the argument that there is inherent value to allowing such 
participation to proceed. 
In this respect, there are both normative and descriptive reasons to 
believe that the Court might defer to the kind of participatory argument 
made by early writers when deciding whether to allow an intervention 
to proceed. But this is only one side of the coin. On the other side, and 
as I explained above, considerations exist that could serve to undermine 
the democratic standing of the Court—whether it be the Court’s efficient 
operation, its accountability to the public, or a mixture of both. The crux 
of the analysis I have provided is that if the Court is confident that the 
values that stand to be compromised through the participation of outside 
parties are relatively safeguarded—a confidence I have suggested is first 
and foremost secured by the strict formal conditions pertaining to the 
practice—it may at that point turn its attention to other values that may be 
at stake, the most significant of which seems to be the value in participation 
itself. This is the essence of the democratic balancing interpretation I have 
defended in this paper and, if correct, it is an important consideration 
toward fully understanding the Court’s approach to intervention.
Conclusion
My argument in this paper defends the SCC’s approach to intervention. 
The crux of the argument I have advanced is that the Court’s approach 
to intervention allows it to strike a reasonable balance among competing 
democratic considerations, none of which are automatically more valuable 
than any other in the context of judicial decision-making. Although I 
make no definitive claims about the accuracy of my account, it is one 
that is both normatively attractive and able to explain the historical record 
of granting interventions at the Supreme Court. The Court should be 
commended for identifying a way to liberalize a practice that possesses 
many democratically-attractive features but also the inherent capacity to 
undermine the democratic standing of the Court.
A recent statement issued by the Supreme Court lends weight to my 
interpretation of the Court’s policy on intervention. In a Notice to the 
Profession issued in March 2017, the Court made clear that “the purpose 
of an intervention is to provide relevant submissions that will be useful to 
the Court and different from those of the other parties. Intervenors shall 
101. Alarie, supra note 1 at 389.
102. Ibid.
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not make any statement with respect to the outcome of the appeal in their 
factum”103—which was a not-so-subtle reminder of the rules that had been 
in effect for decades. In addition to this, two minor adjustments were 
announced concerning those rules, both of which addressed time sensitive 
aspects of the practice.104 
To understand what may have caused the Court to make these 
adjustments, it is important to note that nine months prior a decision was 
rendered in the R v Jordan appeal, a case that focused specifically on the 
right to due process and the responsibility of the courts to ensure that 
justice is carried out in a timely and efficient manner. In its judgment in 
that appeal, the SCC declared that the (criminal) justice system in Canada 
had “come to tolerate excessive delays,” which, it said, could be attributed 
to a “culture of complacency.”105 Remedial actions were taken and the 
Court created a new framework to judge whether a citizen’s due process 
rights had been infringed or denied, imposing a presumptive ceiling on 
how long the state had to bring an accused person to trial (18 months for 
trials going to a provincial court; 30 months for trials going to a superior 
court).106 This in turn caused some uncertainty within the bar as to what 
those limits would mean for the proper dispensation of justice.107
It is of course possible to read the dovetailing of the Jordan decision 
with the Court’s opting to adjust various aspects of its procedural 
guidelines as a simple coincidence. But this is unlikely. The more 
plausible explanation suggests that Jordan was a salient indicator that 
the efficient administration of justice in Canada was under siege, and 
that modifications to the processes by which courts operate would likely 
have to be put to effect. Chief Justice McLachlin suggested as much in a 
speech delivered just after Jordan was released, her claim being that by 
“improving and coordinating the administration of justice” the “serious 
problem that imperils the public’s confidence in the justice system” could 
be mitigated.108 
103. Notice to Profession, supra note 4.
104. The first was a reduction in time allotted to intervenors for making an oral argument (ibid); and 
the second a reduction in time to file an intervening factum (Supreme Court of Canada, “Guide to the 
2017 Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2017), online: Supreme Court of 
Canada <web.archive.org/web/20171212191039/https://www.scc-csc.ca/ar-lr/amend-modif2017-01-
01-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/UC3G-D3AY] [2017 Guide].
105. R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 4 [Jordan].
106. Ibid.
107. Maxime Charron-Tousignant, “Unreasonable Delays in Criminal Trials: the Impact of the Jordan 
Decision” (11 December 2017), online: Hillnotes <hillnotes.ca/2017/12/11/unreasonable-delays-in-
criminal-trials-the-impact-of-the-jordan-decision/> [perma.cc/R9UV-WTF6].
108. Beverley McLachlin, “Remarks to the Council of the Canadian Bar Association at the Canadian 
Legal Conference” (11 August 2016), online: Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.ca/judges-
Intervenors at the Supreme Court of Canada 29
The Court may therefore be understood to have recognized that the 
problem of the efficient administration of justice has come to a boil. Its latest 
changes to the intervention procedure address that mechanism to ensure it 
does not exacerbate administrative inefficiency and delay. And while the 
target of this effort has by no means been limited to intervention,109 for the 
reasons mentioned earlier, it would surely be considered one of the marks. 
In this respect, a gentle reminder to the profession about the rules around 
intervention, as well as a slight adjustment to the time-related elements 
of those rules, play some part toward rebalancing a scale the Court may 
believe is out of alignment. If the analysis I provide in this paper is an 
accurate rendering of the Court’s behaviour, these recent actions should 
not be read as a change of course concerning the Court’s fuller approach 
to intervention, but rather as a perfectly predictable—and normatively 
fitting—instantiation of it.
juges/spe-dis/bm-2016-08-11-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/BV5X-JH8C].
109. 2017 Guide, supra note 106.
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